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Abstract—Nowadays, all major web browsers have a private
browsing mode. However, the mode’s benefits and limitations
are not particularly understood. Through the use of survey
studies, prior work has found that most users are either unaware
of private browsing or do not use it. Further, those who do
use private browsing generally have misconceptions about what
protection it provides.
However, prior work has not investigated why users misun-
derstand the benefits and limitations of private browsing. In this
work, we do so by designing and conducting a three-part study:
(1) an analytical approach combining cognitive walkthrough and
heuristic evaluation to inspect the user interface of private mode
in different browsers; (2) a qualitative, interview-based study
to explore users’ mental models of private browsing and its
security goals; (3) a participatory design study to investigate
why existing browser disclosures, the in-browser explanations
of private browsing mode, do not communicate the security
goals of private browsing to users. Participants critiqued the
browser disclosures of three web browsers: Brave, Firefox, and
Google Chrome, and then designed new ones. We recruited 25
demographically-diverse participants for the second and third
parts of the study.
We find that the user interface of private mode in different
web browsers violates several well-established design guidelines
and heuristics. Further, most participants had incorrect mental
models of private browsing, influencing their understanding and
usage of private mode. Additionally, we find that existing browser
disclosures are not only vague, but also misleading. None of the
three studied browser disclosures communicates or explains the
primary security goal of private browsing. Drawing from the
results of our user study, we extract a set of design recommenda-
tions that we encourage browser designers to validate, in order to
design more effective and informative browser disclosures related
to private mode.
I. INTRODUCTION
Prior work has extensively explored users’ online privacy
concerns when using the Internet [1]–[8]. For example, a
survey of 1,002 US respondents (conducted by the Pew Re-
search Center in 2013) found that respondents were concerned
about their personal information being available online [5].
Respondents also felt strongly about controlling who had ac-
cess to their behavioural data and communications, including
family members, partners, friends, employers, advertisers, and
government agencies. In 2015, Angulo and Ortlieb conducted
a user study to investigate users’ concerns with regards to
∗ The study was conducted while the author was an intern at Brave
Software.
“online privacy-related panic” incidents [7]. They identified 18
different incidents that would make participants panic or
distress. Online tracking, reputation loss, and financial harm
were the most frequently reported incidents by participants.
Prior work has also found that users are willing to take
measures to protect their online privacy. In the same Pew
Research Center survey [5], a clear majority (86%) of respon-
dents reported they had taken steps to remove or hide their
“digital footprints,” including clearing their browsing history
and cookies. Further, Kang et al. conducted a user study to
investigate how users would react to security and privacy
risks [9]; 77% of non-technical participants reported taking
several measures to protect their “digital traces,” including the
use of private browsing mode.
As we can see, users have serious concerns about their
online privacy, and try to employ different strategies or use
different privacy-enhancing tools to protect it. In this work, we
focus on evaluating the end-user experience of one of these
tools: private browsing mode*. Private browsing is a privacy-
enhancing technology (PET) that allows a user to browse the
Internet without saving information about the websites they
visited in private mode on their local device. As of today, all
major web browsers have a private browsing mode.
Previous user studies have quantitatively – mainly through
survey studies – investigated whether users are aware of private
browsing, what they use it for, and whether they understand
what protection it provides [10]–[15]. However, these studies
have not investigated why most users misunderstand the bene-
fits and limitations of private browsing mode. Further, the vast
majority of recruited participants in these studies were unaware
of or had not used private mode. In this work, we address these
research gaps by designing and conducting a three-part study,
where we recruited 25 demographically-diverse participants
(both users and non-users of private mode) for the second
and third parts of the study.
First, we use a hybrid analytical approach combining cog-
nitive walkthrough and heuristic evaluation to inspect the
user interface of private mode in different web browsers. We
identify several violations of well-known design guidelines
and heuristics in the user interface of private mode. We
* In this paper, we use the terms “private browsing mode,” “private
browsing,” and “private mode” interchangeably.
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find some of these violations hampered the adoption and
appropriate use of private mode.
Second, we conduct a qualitative, interview-based study
to explore users’ mental models of private browsing and its
security goals. We find participants’ conceptual understanding
of the term “private browsing” influenced their mental models
and usage of private mode in real life. Further, almost all
participants did not understand the primary security goal of
private browsing. Alarmingly, we find that all participants
who used private mode performed their private browsing
activities while being authenticated to their personal online
account (mainly their Google account to access certain
online Google services), incorrectly believing their browsing
or search history would be deleted after exiting private mode.
Third, we perform a participatory design study to investigate
whether existing browser disclosures, the full-page explana-
tions browsers present when users open a new private tab or
window in private mode, communicate the security goals of
private browsing to users. We ask participants to critique the
browser disclosures of Brave, Firefox, and Google Chrome,
and then design new ones. We find that none of the three
disclosures communicates the primary security goal of
private browsing. Our participants also pointed out that
disclosures do not explain where information related to a
private browsing session gets deleted from, and when.
Contributions. Our primary contributions are:
• We perform the first usability inspection of private mode
in different web browsers using an analytical approach
combining cognitive walkthrough and heuristic evalua-
tion. We find the user interface of private mode violates
several design guidelines and heuristics.
• We conduct the first qualitative user study to explore why
most users misunderstand the benefits and limitations of
private browsing. We do so by conducting an interview-
based study with both users and non-users of private
mode. We explore users’ mental models of private brows-
ing and its security goals, and how these models influence
users’ understanding and usage of private mode.
• We perform the first participatory design study to im-
prove the design of browser disclosures related to private
browsing mode. Prior work [11], [14], [15] has suggested
that existing browser disclosures should be redesigned to
better convey the actual benefits and limitations of private
mode. In this paper, we do so by allowing our participants
to take part in designing these disclosures; participants
critiqued the browser disclosures of Brave, Firefox, and
Google Chrome, explained why these disclosures are
misleading, and then designed new ones.
• We extract a set of design recommendations that we en-
courage browser designers to validate (by implementing
and testing), in order to design more effective browser
disclosures.
II. RELATED WORK
A. User Studies of Private Browsing Mode
Prior work has quantitatively (mainly through survey stud-
ies) investigated whether users are aware of private browsing,
what they use it for, and whether they understand what
protection it provides. In [11], Gao et al. conducted a survey
of 200 Mechanical Turk (MTurk) respondents in the US,
examining their private browsing habits. They found that one-
third of respondents were not aware of private browsing.
Those who had used private browsing reported using it for
protecting personal information, online shopping, or visit-
ing “embarrassing websites.” Further, most respondents had
misconceptions about private browsing – such as incorrectly
believing that private mode protects from visited websites.
Gao et al. concluded that browsers do not effectively inform
users of the benefits and limitations of private browsing, and
that “browser designers [should think of] various ways to
[better] inform users.”
In 2017, DuckDuckGo, an Internet search engine, surveyed
a sample of 5,710 US respondents, recruited via Survey-
Monkey [12]. Respondents were asked to share their expe-
rience with private browsing. Again, one-third of respondents
reported they had not heard of private browsing. Of those
who had used private browsing, one-third used it frequently,
and three-quarters were not able to accurately identify the
benefits of private browsing. The report did not offer any
recommendations beyond the study.
Using a similar study to [12], Bursztein ran an online
survey of 200 US respondents (via Google Consumer Sur-
veys) in 2017 [13]. He found about one-third of surveyed
respondents did not know about private browsing. Of those
who were aware of the technology, only 20% had used it.
Further, about one-half preferred not to disclose what they
used private browsing for. Additionally, only 40% claimed
they used private browsing for its intended purpose: leaving
no traces of the websites visited in private mode on the local
machine. Bursztein concluded that the computer security and
privacy community should raise awareness of what private
browsing can and cannot achieve.
Recently, Wu et al. surveyed 460 US respondents through
MTurk [14]. Respondents were randomly assigned one of 13
different browser disclosures related to private mode. Based
on the disclosure they saw, respondents were asked to answer
a set of questions to assess their understanding of private
mode. Wu et al. found that existing browser disclosures do
not sufficiently inform users of the benefits and limitations of
private mode. They concluded that browser disclosures should
be redesigned to better convey the actual protections of private
browsing. They also argued that the term “private browsing”
could be misleading. In this work, we explore how users’
conceptual understanding of the term “private browsing”
influences their understanding and usage of private mode
in real life.
Habib et al. conducted a user study to observe the private
browsing habits of over 450 US participants using software
monitoring [15]. They then asked participants to answer a
follow-up survey (using MTurk) to investigate discrepancies,
if any, between observed and self-reported private browsing
habits. They found that participants used private mode for
online shopping and visiting adult websites. The primary use
cases of private mode were consistent across observed and
self-reported data. They also found that most participants
overestimated the benefits of private mode, concluding by
supporting “changes to private browsing disclosures.”
Summary. Prior work has employed quantitative methods –
mainly through conducting surveys – to investigate whether
users are aware of private browsing, what they use it for,
and whether they understand what protection it provides (see
Table V in Appendix E). However, prior work has not investi-
gated why users misunderstand the benefits and limitations
of private browsing. Further, most recruited participants in
prior user studies either were unaware of or had not used
private mode. In this work, we address these research gaps
by designing and conducting a three-part user study: (1)
the first usability inspection of private mode in different
web browsers, (2) the first qualitative, interview-based user
study, and (3) the first participatory design study. We also
recruit both users and non-users of private mode.
B. Mental Models
Users make computer security- and privacy-related deci-
sions on a regular basis. These decisions are guided by
users’ mental models of computer security and privacy. A
mental model is someone’s understanding or representation
of how something works [16]. In their seminal paper, Saltzer
and Schroeder provided eight principles that guide the de-
sign and implementation of computer security (or protection)
mechanisms [17]. One of these principles is psychological
acceptability: if there is a mismatch between a user’s mental
image of a protection mechanism and how the mechanism
works in the real world, the user will be unable to use the
mechanism correctly. Wash and Rader proposed a new way
to improve user security behaviour: instead of trying to teach
non-technical users “correct” mental models, we should ex-
plore their existing models [18]. Wash conducted a qualitative
study to investigate users’ mental models of home computer
security [19]. He identified eight “folk models” of security
threats that are applied by home computer users to make
security-related decisions. Zeng et al. qualitatively studied
users’ security and privacy concerns with smart homes [20].
They found gaps in threat models, arising from limited tech-
nical understanding of smart homes.
Kang et al. undertook a qualitative study to explore users’
mental models of the Internet [21]. Oates et al. studied users’
mental models of privacy, asking end-users, privacy experts,
and children to draw their models [22]. Through the use
of interviews and surveys, Renaud et al. investigated users’
mental models of encrypted email, and found that, in addition
to poor usability, incomplete threat models, misaligned incen-
tives, and lack of understanding of how email works are key
barriers to adopting encrypted email [23]. Abu-Salma et al.
qualitatively and quantitatively explored users’ mental models
of secure communication tools, and found that most users
perceived encrypted communications as futile [24], [25]. Wu
and Zappala conducted a qualitative user study to investigate
users’ perceptions of encryption and its role in their life [26].
They identified four users’ mental models of encryption that
varied in complexity and detail. Krombholz et al. qualitatively
explored end-users and system administrators’ mental models
of HTTPS, revealing a wide range of misconceptions [27].
Gallagher et al. qualitatively studied experts and non-experts’
perceptions and usage of the Tor anonymity network, identify-
ing gaps in understanding the underlying operation of Tor [28].
Summary. Prior work has explored users’ mental models of
different computer security and privacy concepts and tools. In
this work, we qualitatively investigate users’ mental models
of private browsing and its security goals. We also give
participants the option to draw their models.
C. Security and Privacy Design
Within web browsers, prior work has investigated the design
of alert messages and warnings [29]–[36], browser security
indicators [37]–[39], site trustworthiness [40], [41], privacy
policies [42], [43], storage policies [44], and ad personaliza-
tion [45].
However, prior work has heavily focused on the design of
warning messages – especially phishing warnings [29], [30],
[33], [34] and SSL warnings [31], [32], [34]–[36] – in order
to capture users’ attention, improve their comprehension, and
warn them away from danger. For example, Egelman et al.
recommended that phishing warning messages should be ac-
tive (i.e.interrupt the user flow) and should be distinguishable
by severity [30]. They also suggested it should be difficult
for users to click-through phishing warnings, by requiring
users to bypass several screens in an attempt to dissuade users
from ignoring warnings. Additionally, Egelman and Schechter
showed that changes to the look and feel of phishing warnings
have resulted in more users noticing them [33]. Felt et al.
recommended warning designers use opinionated design to
improve user adherence to warnings [36].
Further, several researchers have focused on reducing user
habituation to security warnings [46]–[48]. Brustoloni and
Villamarin-Salomon suggested the use of polymorphic and
audited dialogues [49]. Bravo-Lillo et al. explored the use of
attractors [50]. Anderson et al. varied size, colour, and option
order [51].
Summary. The aforementioned work has mainly focused
on the design of browser warning messages to improve their
efficacy. However, our study focuses on designing browser
disclosures that sufficiently inform users of the benefits and
limitations of a privacy-enhancing technology (private brows-
ing). Although we draw inspiration from this work, we answer
a different important question of how to design browser
disclosures to help users appropriately use private brows-
ing mode. We do so by employing participatory design [52],
asking participants to critique existing browser disclosures and
design new ones. Unlike warning designers who have explored
different ideas – such as changing the design of a warning
message or using attractors – to improve user attention to
and comprehension of warnings, we choose, in this work, to
engage users in the design of browser disclosures (related
to private browsing mode).
III. PRIVATE BROWSING MODE
Private browsing is a privacy-enhancing technology (PET)
that allows the user to browse the Internet without locally
saving information (e.g., browsing history, cookies, temporary
files) about the websites they visited in private mode [53].
Nowadays, all major web browsers support private browsing.
Different browsers refer to it using different names. For
example, private browsing is known as Incognito Browsing in
Google Chrome, InPrivate Browsing in Microsoft Edge and
Microsoft Explorer, and Private Browsing in Brave, Firefox,
Opera, and Safari. Further, Brave distinguishes between a Pri-
vate Tab and a Private Tab with Tor, a new feature that was
added in June 2018 [54].
Private browsing goals. The primary security goal of private
browsing is that a local attacker – such as a family member,
a friend, or a work colleague – who takes control of the
user’s machine after the user exits a private browsing session
should find no evidence of the websites the user visited in that
session [53]. That is, a local attacker who has (physical or
remote) access to the user’s machine at time T should learn
nothing about the user’s private browsing activities prior to
time T. Therefore, private browsing does not protect against
a local attacker who controls the user’s machine before or
during a private browsing session; a motivated attacker (e.g.,
a suspicious wife) can install a key-logger or a spyware and
monitor the user’s (e.g., husband’s) private browsing activities.
Further, private browsing does not aim to protect against a
web attacker who, unlike a local attacker, does not control the
user’s machine but controls the websites visited by the user in
private mode [53]. Even if the user is not authenticated to an
online service, a website can uniquely identify them through
their client’s IP address. Also, the user’s various browser
features – such as screen resolution, timezone, and installed
extensions – can easily enable browser fingerprinting [53] and,
hence, website tracking.
Additionally, private browsing does not aim to hide the
user’s private browsing activities from their browser vendor,
Internet service provider (ISP), employer, or government.
To achieve the primary security goal of private browsing,
once a user terminates a private browsing session, most web
browsers claim to delete the user’s private browsing history,
cookies, information entered in forms (e.g., login data, search
items), and temporary files from the user’s local device.
Further, some browsers do not locally store the bookmarks
created and files downloaded in a private browsing session.
Table I summarizes the functionality of private mode in seven
browsers.
Private browsing implementations. While all major web
browsers have a private mode, each browser’s implementation
of private browsing is different [53]. Further, most browsers
update their implementation based on user demand. For ex-
ample, some browsers have recently added privacy features
to help reduce website tracking (although protecting against
website tracking is not a security goal of private mode). Brave
has added onion routing (Tor) as an option to its private
tabs [54]. Firefox disables third-party cookies to stop some
types of tracking by advertisers [55]. Opera also supports a
VPN service [56].
Additionally, most implementations of private browsing are
imperfect. Prior work in the field of computer forensics has
found residual artifacts that remain on the user’s local machine
(after the user terminates their private browsing session) that
could be used to identify the user’s private browsing activi-
ties [57]–[59]. For example, Ohana and Shashidhar were able
to recover all cached images, URL history, and usernames
(with their associated accounts) from RAM and memory
dumps for browsing activities performed in Internet Explorer’s
InPrivate mode (version 8.0) [57]. For further attacks, we refer
the reader to [53].
Although these attacks are crucial to consider in order to
achieve overall browser security, they are not the focus of our
work. In this paper, we evaluate the end-user experience of
private mode.
IV. METHODOLOGY
To explore why most users misunderstand the benefits and
limitations of private browsing, we designed and conducted a
three-part study:
1) A hybrid analytical approach combining cognitive walk-
through and heuristic evaluation to inspect the user in-
terface of private mode in different web browsers and
identify any usability issues.
2) A qualitative, interview-based user study to explore users’
mental models of private browsing and its security goals,
and how these models influence users’ understanding and
usage of private mode.
3) A participatory design study to investigate why existing
browser disclosures do not communicate the actual pro-
tection of private mode.
For the second and third parts of the study, a trained
researcher conducted all interviews in the UK in English
between August 2018 and September 2018, by first con-
ducting 5 unstructured (open-ended) face-to-face interviews,
lasting for 60 minutes on average each (see Table III in
Appendix B). The emerging themes from these 5 interviews
helped us design the study script we used to conduct our main
interviews, 25 semi-structured face-to-face interviews lasting
for 90 minutes on average each (see Table II in Section V-A).
When conducting the semi-structured interviews, the inter-
viewer allowed participants to share their thoughts and ask any
clarification questions. Further, the interviewer probed where
appropriate, which is a common practice in semi-structured
interviews — the interviewer uses a list of questions (i.e., a
study script), but can ask follow-up questions as well as skip
TABLE I
PRIVATE BROWSING FUNCTIONALITY IN RECENT WEB BROWSER VERSIONS. A CHECKMARK INDICATES AN ITEM IS LOCALLY DELETED ONCE A USER
EXITS PRIVATE MODE, WHEREAS A CROSSMARK INDICATES AN ITEM IS LOCALLY SAVED.
THE TABLE IS NOT FULLY COMPREHENSIVE; OTHER ITEMS NOT SHOWN INCLUDE: BROWSER CACHE, TEMPORARY FILES, HTML LOCAL STORAGE,
FORM AUTO-COMPLETION, CLIENT CERTIFICATES, BROWSER PATCHES, PHISHING BLOCK LIST, AND PER-SITE ZOOM LEVEL. THERE HAS BEEN NO
RECENT ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE BROWSING SINCE THE 2010 WORK OF AGGARWAL ET AL. [53].
Brave Firefox Google Chrome Internet Explorer Microsoft Edge Opera Safari
0.55 62.0.3 69.0.3497.100 11 44.17763.1.0 56.0.3051.36 12.0
Browsing history X X X X X X X
Cookies X X X X X X X
Login data X X X X X X X
Search items X X X X X X X
Bookmarks
Downloads X X X
questions that have already been covered. Below, we describe
our study script (see Section IV-C and Section IV-D).
A. Research Questions
In this paper, we answer the following research questions:
• RQ1: Does private mode in different web browsers suffer
from poor usability that hampers the widespread adoption
and use of private browsing?
• RQ2: How do users perceive the term “private brows-
ing?”
• RQ3: What are users’ mental models of private brows-
ing (as a privacy-enhancing technology) and its security
goals?
• RQ4: How do users perceive those who use private
browsing? Do users perceive the routine use of private
browsing as “paranoid” or “unnecessary?”
• RQ5: How do users’ mental models and perceptions
influence their usage of private browsing?
• RQ6: Why do existing browser disclosures (related to
private browsing) misinform users of the benefits and
limitations of private browsing?
• RQ7: How can the design of browser disclosures be
improved?
B. Part 1: Identifying Usability Issues
Usability inspection has seen increasing use since the 1990s
as a way to evaluate the user interface of a computer sys-
tem [60]. Usability inspection is aimed at finding usability
problems in the user interface design and evaluating the overall
usability of an entire system. Unlike empirical user studies
(see parts 2 and 3 of our study below), a user interface is
inspected by developers and evaluators without engaging users
(i.e., without recruiting participants to assess the usability of
a system). Evaluating a design with no users are present can
identify problems that may not necessarily be revealed by an
evaluation with users [60]–[63]. Although it is important to
bring users into the design process, evaluating a design without
users can also provide benefits.
There are several usability inspection methods. In this work,
we use a hybrid approach combining cognitive walkthrough
and heuristic evaluation to inspect the user interface of private
mode in five different web browsers: Brave, Google Chrome,
Microsoft Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, and Safari. Both
methods are actively used in human-computer interaction
(HCI) research [64].
Cognitive Walkthrough. Cognitive walkthrough is a usability
inspection method that focuses on evaluating a user interface
design for its exploratory learnability, a key aspect of
usability testing [65] based on a cognitive model of learning
and use [66], [67]. First-time users of a system may prefer to
learn how to use it by exploring it, rather than investing time in
comprehensive formal training or reading long tutorials [68].
Cognitive walkthrough identifies problems that users could
have as they approach an interface for the first time. It also
identifies mismatches between how users and designers con-
ceptualize a task, as well as how designers make assumptions
about users’ knowledge of a specific task (which could, for
example, impact the labelling of buttons and icons).
Cognitive walkthrough is task-specific, studying one or
more user tasks. The process comprises a preparatory phase
and an analysis phase. In the preparatory phase, evaluators
decide and agree on the input to the cognitive walkthrough
process: (1) a detailed description of the user interface, (2)
the user interface’s likely user population and context of
use, (3) a task scenario, and (4) a sequence of actions that
users need to accurately perform to successfully complete the
designated task. In the analysis phase, evaluators examine each
of the actions needed to accomplish the task. The cognitive
walkthrough process follows a structured series of questions,
derived from the theory of exploratory learning, to evaluate
each step (or action) in the workflow. A detailed overview of
the cognitive walkthrough process can be found in [69].
Heuristic Evaluation. In 1990, Nielsen and Molich intro-
duced a new method for evaluating a user interface, called
heuristic evaluation [60]. Heuristic evaluation involves hav-
ing usability evaluators judge dialogue elements in an in-
terface against established usability principles (“heuristics”).
Ten heuristics, derived by Nielsen and Molich, can be found
in [60]. The use of a complete and detailed list of usability
heuristics as a checklist is considered to add formalism.
Jeffries et al. found that heuristic evaluation uncovered more
issues than any other evaluation methods, whereas empirical
user studies (see parts 2 and 3 below) revealed more severe,
recurring, and global problems that are more likely to nega-
tively affect the user experience of a system [70].
Hybrid Approach. To avoid biases inherent in either of
the usability inspection methods, we used a hybrid approach
combining two of the most actively used and researched meth-
ods: cognitive walkthrough and heuristic evaluation. Combin-
ing both task scenarios and heuristics was recommended by
Nielsen [71] and Sears [72]. We describe the hybrid approach
in Appendix A.
C. Part 2: Exploring Mental Models and Usage
After inspecting the user interface of private mode and
identifying several usability issues, we aimed to answer RQ2–
RQ5 (see Section IV-A), by qualitatively investigating par-
ticipants’ mental models of private browsing and its security
goals, as well as exploring how participants perceived those
who (regularly or occasionally) use private browsing. We also
aimed to understand how participants’ mental models and
perceptions influenced their understanding and usage of private
mode.
Hence, we explored the following themes:
Mental models of “private browsing”. We asked participants
whether they have heard of the term “private browsing,” and,
if so, whether or not they felt confident explaining what it
meant. We then asked them to explain what it meant to browse
privately. We provided participants with a large pad of paper
and a 24-colour pack of markers, giving them the option to
draw their mental models of private browsing. Further, we
asked participants to describe the benefits and drawbacks, if
any, of browsing privately.
By asking these questions, we aimed to investigate partic-
ipants’ conceptual understanding of the term “private brows-
ing,” and how this understanding influenced their mental
models and usage of private mode (as a privacy-enhancing
technology), as we describe in detail next.
Mental models of private mode (as a PET). After explor-
ing participants’ general mental models of the term “private
browsing,” we asked participants whether they had browsed in
private mode and, if so, whether they felt confident explaining
what it meant to open a private tab or window. We then asked
them to explain the difference, if any, between default (non-
private) browsing mode and private browsing mode.
We also aimed to understand how participants perceived the
security goals of private mode. Hence, we asked them about
the entities, if any, that could learn about their private browsing
activities (e.g., visited websites in private mode), and how. We
wanted to explore whether participants understood the primary
security goal of private browsing: protecting against a local
attacker who takes control of a user’s machine after the user
exits private browsing (see Section III).
Perceptions of users of private mode. We then asked
participants to explain how they perceived those who use,
or would be interested in using, private mode. We aimed to
investigate whether participants perceived the use of private
mode as paranoid or unnecessary.
Expectations. We asked participants to describe what they
would expect from private mode. We also investigated whether
participants’ familiarity with private mode affected the robust-
ness of their mental models. Therefore, we asked participants
to list the web browsers they regularly used (as well as those
they did not necessarily use) and that they considered having
a private mode that met their expectations.
Private browsing usage. Finally, we aimed to explore how
participants’ mental models and perceptions influenced their
usage of private mode. Hence, we asked participants who used,
or had used in the past, private mode to share their private
browsing habits. We asked them what they used private mode
for, how often they used it, and where they used it. We also
asked them to explain what they liked and disliked about
private mode.
D. Part 3: Designing Better Browser Disclosures
After exploring our participants’ mental models and usage
of private mode, we aimed to investigate why browser dis-
closures (related to private browsing) do not communicate the
actual benefits and limitations of private browsing. We also
sought to improve the design of existing browser disclosures.
Hence, we performed a participatory design study to solicit
new disclosure designs from our participants.
Assessing participants’ knowledge of private mode (before
tutorial). To answer RQ6 and RQ7 (see Section IV-A), we
first asked our participants to take a short quiz to further test
their knowledge of private browsing. We asked them to answer
the following questions about a private browsing mode that
works properly:
• Private mode hides my browsing activities from [browser
vendor].
• If I visited a website in private mode, the website would
not be able to determine whether I was browsing in
private or public mode.
• After I exited private mode, a family member would not
be able to learn about my activities in private mode.
• Before I start browsing in private mode, a family member
will not be able to learn about the websites I plan to visit
in private mode.
• Private mode encrypts information I send and receive
while browsing in private mode.
• Private mode hides my browsing activities from my
school or employer.
• Private mode hides my identity from websites I visit.
We also asked participants whether they were familiar with
the following items that appear on almost all of today’s
browser disclosures, and whether they felt confident explaining
what each item meant: browsing history file, cookies, search
items, bookmarks, downloads, and temporary files.
Giving a tutorial. We then gave participants a 15-minute
tutorial, explaining the primary security goal of private brows-
ing, the difference between default browsing mode and private
browsing mode, and why private browsing does not protect
against website fingerprinting and, hence, website tracking and
ad targeting. Further, we explained the different items/files that
most web browsers claim to delete once a user exits private
mode (see Section III). We also explained the different privacy
features that have been recently added by some web browsers
(e.g., Brave’s Private Tabs with Tor). Finally, we explained
the difference between a private tab, a private window, and a
private session.
Assessing participants’ knowledge of private mode (after
tutorial). To evaluate whether participants’ knowledge of
private browsing had improved after the tutorial, we asked
participants to take the same quiz we gave them previously.
However, we shuffled the questions to minimize bias.
Critiquing existing disclosures. We then asked participants
to critique existing browser disclosures (using the knowledge
they acquired from the tutorial). We sought to get feedback
on three disclosures, as well as solicit new disclosure designs
from participants. Hence, we asked each participant to cri-
tique the browser disclosures of three web browsers: Brave,
Firefox, and Google Chrome. To minimize bias, disclosures
were assigned to each participant randomly. We chose these
three disclosures because Firefox and Chrome were the most
frequently-used browsers by our participants. Further, Brave
was launched with privacy as a key selling point.
We showed participants one disclosure at a time. We then
asked them to describe what they felt about the disclosure,
how useful they felt the explanation was, what about the
explanation would make them decide to use or not use private
mode, and what else they would like the disclosure to tell
them or elaborate on. We gave participants green and red
markers to highlight what they liked and disliked about the
disclosure. We then showed participants the second disclosure
and followed-up by asking the same questions we asked about
the first disclosure they saw. We also asked participants to
compare the second disclosure to the first one, and then explain
whether they would be more or less likely to use private mode
if they saw this disclosure or the prior one. Additionally, we
showed participants the third disclosure and asked them the
same questions we previously asked.
Soliciting new disclosure designs. Finally, we performed
a participatory design study to solicit new disclosure designs
from our participants. We asked participants to describe private
browsing as if they were explaining it to someone new to this
privacy-enhancing technology. We prompted our participants
as follows: “We would like you to design a browser disclosure
that clearly explains the benefits and limitations of private
browsing. While designing, think about what would make you
use private mode, what information you would want to know,
what information you would want to omit, and how you would
want the disclosure to look.” We gave participants a large
pad of paper and a 24-colour pack of markers to design their
disclosures, giving them the option to draw.
We also asked participants to share their thoughts on the
following names: “Private Browsing,” “InPrivate Browsing,”
and “Incognito Browsing,” and suggest a new name, if any.
E. Recruitment
In this work, our focus is to understand how mainstream
users perceive private browsing and its security goals. This
understanding is crucial to design browser disclosures that
sufficiently inform the general public of the benefits and
limitations of private browsing. We do not investigate how
a specific at-risk user group – such as activists, journalists, or
whistle-blowers – perceive and use private browsing. However,
we have documented our study protocol step-by-step, meaning
that it can be replicated with different user groups in varying
contexts.
To recruit our participants (for the second and third parts
of the study†), we posted flyers and distributed leaflets in
London (UK). We asked interested participants to complete an
online screening questionnaire, which about 500 completed.
We aimed to recruit a demographically-diverse sample of
participants. Hence, we included a number of demographic
questions about gender, age, race, educational level, and
employment status. We also assessed participants’ technical
knowledge; we considered participants as technical if two out
of three of the following were true [73]: (1) participants had an
education in, and/or worked in, the field of computer science,
computer engineering, or IT; (2) they were familiar with or
an expert in at least one programming language (e.g., C++);
(3) people usually asked them for computer-related advice.
Further, we provided participants with a list of different web
browsers, and then asked which browsers they used, what they
used each browser for (in case they used multiple browsers),
which browser they used the most, and how many hours they
spent daily on their desktop and mobile phone browsing.
Additionally, we asked participants to list the digital security
requirements they had at school or work, how often they
received cybersecurity training, and whether they felt at risk
due to their school work or job duties. In [74], Gaw et al. found
that people perceived the “universal, routine use of encryption
as paranoid.” In this work, we aimed to explore whether our
participants perceived the everyday use of private mode as
paranoid and unnecessary.
We first conducted and analyzed 5 unstructured interviews
(to help us design the study script, which we describe in detail
in Section IV-C and Section IV-D), followed by 25 semi-
structured interviews (our study’s main interviews).
F. Pilot Study
Quiz piloting. After developing an initial questionnaire
of our quiz (see Section IV-D), we conducted interviews
with 5 demographically-diverse participants (see Table IV in
Appendix C). Cognitive interviewing is a method used to
pre-test questionnaires to glean insights into how participants
might interpret and answer questions [75]. After answering
† We did not recruit participants for the first part of the study (usability
inspection).
each quiz question, participants were asked to share their
thoughts and answer the following: “Was this question difficult
to understand or answer?;” “How did answering the question
make you feel?” We then used the findings to revise our quiz,
and evaluate question wording and bias.
Main study piloting. To pre-test the second and third parts of
our study (pre-screening questionnaire, study script, and quiz),
we conducted a small-scale pilot study of 5 semi-structured
interviews. We used the common practice of convenience
sampling [75], by selecting 5 colleagues for the pilot study.
Additionally, we asked 10 computer security and privacy
researchers and experts to review the study. We used the
findings to identify potential problems (e.g.time, cost, adverse
events) in advance prior to conducting the full-scale study.
Drawing from the findings of our pilot study, we made the
following study design changes:
• We decided to give participants a 10-minute break be-
tween the second (interviews) and third (participatory
design) parts of the study, to reduce interviewee fatigue
and inattention [76].
• As part of the participatory design study, we asked
participants to take a quiz (before our tutorial) to assess
their knowledge of private mode. Based on the pilot study
findings, we decided to give participants the same quiz af-
ter the tutorial, to assess whether or not participants’
knowledge had improved before they started analyzing
and critiquing browser disclosures.
• We first aimed to ask participants to critique the browser
disclosures of five web browsers: Brave, Google Chrome,
Microsoft Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, and Safari
(as part of the participatory design study). However, due
to interviewee fatigue (as per our pilot study findings),
we decided to analyze the disclosures of three browsers
– Brave, Chrome, and Firefox – based on how popular
the browser is and how it advertises itself (e.g., as fast,
safe, or private).
G. Data Analysis
Part 1 of study. Two researchers inspected the user interface
of private mode in Brave, Google Chrome, Microsoft Internet
Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, and Safari. They did so indepen-
dently before discussing the findings and aggregating all the
uncovered issues in a larger set.
Parts 2 and 3 of study. To develop depth in our exploratory
research, we conducted multiple rounds of interviews, punctu-
ated with periods of analysis and tentative conclusions [77]. In
total, we conducted, transcribed (using an external transcrip-
tion service) and analyzed all 5 unstructured and 25 semi-
structured interviews (the study’s main interviews). We ob-
served data saturation [76], [78] between the 20th and the 25th
semi-structured interview; i.e., no new themes emerged in
interviews 20–25, and, hence, we stopped recruiting partic-
ipants. Data saturation has attained widespread acceptance
as a methodological principle in qualitative research. It is
commonly taken to indicate, on the basis of the data that
has been collected and analyzed, further data collection and
analysis are unnecessary.
Two researchers independently coded all interview tran-
scripts and image data using grounded theory [77], an open-
ended method to discover explanations, grounded in empirical
data, about how things work. The researchers created two
codebooks: one for the interview transcripts and one for the
image data. After creating the final codebook, they tested
for the inter-rater reliability (or inter-coder agreement). The
average Cohen’s kappa coefficient (κ) for all themes in the
interview transcripts and image data was 0.77 and 0.89,
respectively. A κ value above 0.75 is considered excellent
agreement [79].
H. Ethics
Our study was reviewed and approved by our organization’s
ethics committee. Before each interview, we asked participants
to read an information sheet that explained the high-level
purpose of the study and outlined our data-protection prac-
tices. We also asked participants to sign a consent form that
presented all the information required in Article 14 of the EU
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Participants had
the option to withdraw at any point during the study without
providing an explanation. We paid each participant £30.
V. RESULTS
In this section, we present the results of our study. We
first describe the demographics of participants recruited for
the second and third parts of our study (Section V-A). We
then discuss the results of each part of our three-part study
(Sections V-B, V-C, and V-D).
A. Demographics
Table II summarizes the demographics of our sample (n=25
participants). We interviewed 10 male, 13 female, and two
non-binary participants. Participants’ ages ranged from 18
to 75. 12 identified as white, four as black, four as Asian,
three as Hispanic, and two as mixed-race. 11 reported having
a college (or an undergraduate) degree, and eight a graduate (or
postgraduate) degree. Two reported having secondary (or high-
school) education, and three some post-secondary education
(i.e., some college education without a degree). One participant
mentioned having vocational training (VOC). Nine participants
were either high-school or university students, 12 employed,
two unemployed, and one retired. One participant preferred not
to indicate their employment status. According to the definition
we used to assess our participants’ technical knowledge (see
Section IV-E), 17 qualified as technical.
Our participants used a wide range of web browsers (both
on desktop/laptop and mobile phone). Google Chrome was the
most used browser by participants, followed by Safari, Mozilla
Firefox, Microsoft Internet Explorer, and Brave, respectively.
Three participants (P01; P03; P25) used the Tor browser.
We noticed younger participants used (or had used in the
past) multiple web browsers, whereas older or less-educated
participants often used one browser – mainly Safari due to its
compatibility with Apple devices.
Participants daily spent between five and 17 hours
(mean=11.70 hours) browsing the Internet. Desktop/laptop
browsing overtook smartphone surfing, with the exception of
three participants (P02; P12; P16). Further, most participants
(22 out of 25) used multiple browsers for various reasons.
For example, 13 reported they used one browser for social
activities and used a different one for work-related activities.
Prior user studies (see Section II-A) have aimed to un-
derstand what people use private mode for. However, the
vast majority of participants recruited for these studies were
unaware of or had not used private mode. In our work, we
recruited and interviewed both users and non-users of private
mode. 19 participants reported they used (or had used in the
past) private mode. Three (P12; P16; P24) were aware of
private mode, but had not browsed in it. Three (P02; P11;
P23) did not know private mode existed.
Finally, we note P01, P03, P18, and P25 identified as
computer security and privacy experts. Hence, they did not
necessarily represent mainstream users.
TABLE II
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHICS
Gender Age Race Education Employment
P01 Male 25–34 White Ph.D. Student
P02 Male 45–54 Mixed race B.A. Unemployed
P03 Male 45–54 White Ph.D. Unemployed
P04 Female 18–24 Black High-school Student
P05 Female 25–34 White B.A. Employed
P06 Male 35–44 White M.Sc. Employed
P07 Female 18–24 White B.A. Employed
P08 Female 25–34 Asian High-school Student
P09 Male 18–24 Asian M.Sc. Employed
P10 Male 25–34 White Some college Employed
P11 Female 25–34 White M.Sc. Employed
P12 Female 45–54 White Some college Employed
P13 Male 25–34 Mixed race B.A. Employed
P14 Male 18–24 Hispanic B.A. Employed
P15 Female 25–34 Asian B.Sc. Other
P16 Female 45–54 Black VOC Employed
P17 Female 18–24 White Ph.D. Student
P18 Non-binary 35–44 White M.Sc. Employed
P19 Female 35–44 Black B.Sc. Self-employed
P20 Male 18–24 White Some college Retired
P21 Male 25–34 White VOC Student
P22 Male 18–24 Asian Ph.D. Student
P23 Female 25–34 White M.Sc. Student
P24 Female 25–34 Black B.Sc. Student
P25 Female 25–34 Hispanic Some college Student
B. Part 1: Identifying Usability Issues
We used an analytical approach combining cognitive walk-
through and heuristic evaluation to inspect the user interface of
private mode in five different web browsers (desktop versions):
Brave, Google Chrome, Microsoft Internet Explorer, Mozilla
Firefox, and Safari. Our findings are as follows:
Public mode as the default mode. In all modern web
browsers (including the ones we inspected), the default mode
is the public one. To browse in private mode, users need
to select (from a hidden drop-down list) “New Incognito
Window” in Brave and Google Chrome, or “New Private
Window” in Microsoft Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, and
Safari. We hypothesize (and find in Section V-C) that most
users are unaware of the hidden drop-list, which explains why
most users do not know about private mode. This violates
Nielsen’s heuristic of visibility of system status [64] and
aesthetic and minimalist design [64].
Multiple windows and tabs. Users cannot open a private tab
in a public window, and vice-versa; that is, users can only open
public (private) tabs in public (private) windows – which we
regard as good user interface design. Further, users can only
re-open the most recently-closed public tabs, and not private
ones.
Although users can open multiple public and private win-
dows, feedback is minimal. For example, in Safari, when
users enter private mode, there is no appropriate feedback
– through the user interface – that communicates to users
that they are currently browsing in private mode. There is
only a short line of text (using a small font size) at the top
of the page that says: “Private Browsing Enabled,” violating
Nielsen’s heuristic of visibility of system status [64]. In Brave
and Mozilla Firefox, the background changes from white to
purple. Both browsers do not explain why the color purple
was chosen by browser designers.
Use of jargon. Both Brave and Google Chrome refer to
private mode as “Incognito window,” and Microsoft Internet
Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, and Safari as “private window.”
This violates Nielsen’s heuristic of match between the system
and the real world [64], making the assumption that users’
understanding and interpretation of words would be the same
as browser designers and developers. We also hypothesize that
users would build their own mental models of private mode
when encountering these terms, which could strongly impact
how they would perceive and use private mode in real life.
We explore these models in depth in V-C and V-D.
Wordy browser disclosures. When users enter private mode,
a browser disclosure is shown to users. The disclosure is meant
to explain the benefits and limitations of private browsing.
However, the disclosures of all inspected browsers (except
that of Firefox) are lengthy and full of jargon, violating
Nielsens’ heuristic of match between the system and the
real world [64]. Further, browser disclosures do not explain
the primary security goal of private mode. In Firefox, the
disclosure is relatively short, but, also, does not explain the
security goal of private mode.
Further, in all five browsers, users are presented with these
disclosures only once (when they open a private window or
tab), violating Nielsen’s heuristics of recognition rather than
recall [64] and help and documentation [64].
In Section V-D, we present the results of our participants
who critiqued existing browser disclosures and suggested
several design options for improvement, as we explain later
in the paper.
Private browsing and Tor. Brave has recently added Tor to its
private windows. Brave users can now open a “New Window,”
“New Incognito Window,” or “New Private Window with Tor.”
Both Incognito windows and private windows with Tor have
the same purple background and lengthy disclosures, which
could lead users to browse in one instead of the other, violating
Nielsen’s heuristic of visibility of system status [64]. Further,
the browser disclosures of both windows do not clearly explain
how private mode and Tor are two different privacy-enhancing
technologies.
C. Part 2: Exploring Mental Models and Usage
The main purpose of qualitative research is to explore a
phenomenon in depth, and not to investigate whether or not
findings are statistically significant or due to chance [75].
Although we report how many participants mentioned each
finding as an indication of prevalence, our findings are not
quantitative. Further, a participant failing to mention a partic-
ular finding does not imply they disagreed with that finding;
they might have failed to mention it due to, for example, recall
bias [75]. Thus, as with all qualitative data, our findings are
not necessarily generalizable beyond our sample. However,
they suggest several future research avenues, and can be later
supplemented by quantitative data.
In this section and the next section (Section V-D), we
present the results of the second and third parts of the study
(n=25 participants).
Mental models of “private browsing”. We aimed to inves-
tigate our participants’ conceptual understanding of the term
“private browsing.” 18 out of 25 (a clear majority) had heard
of the term, and 17 felt confident explaining what the term
meant‡. 16 out of 17 were users of (or had used in the past)
private mode. One participant (P11) was a non-user.
We then asked all participants to explain what “private
browsing” meant to them. 5 out of 25 associated the term
with private browsing mode, mentioning the following: “the
window that has a man with a coat and a pair of eye
glasses” (x4); “going undercover or incognito” (P04). All
five participants were referring to the “Incognito Window” in
Google Chrome. Further, five participants thought of the term
in connection with network-encrypted communications or se-
cure browser connections (i.e.webpages running HTTPs), three
with end-to-end encrypted communications, three with anony-
mous communications (using Tor or VPN), and three with user
authentication (both one-factor and two-factor authentication).
One participant (P17) associated “private browsing” with both
network encryption and authentication. Additionally, P15 de-
scribed the term as the ability to browse the Internet “without
getting infected with a virus.”
Further, eight participants mentioned the terms “privacy”
and “online privacy” to explain what “private browsing” meant
to them: P01–P05, P07, and P12–P14 defined the term as
having control over how users’ online information is handled
and shared with others. P09, P20, P22, and P24 referred to
the term as the ability to manage and “regulate” one’s social
space.
‡ It is worth to mention that only three out of the 17 confident users
associated the term “private browsing” with private mode. We speculate this
is because these three participants used private mode frequently.
The drawings in Appendix E explain some of our partici-
pants’ mental models of “private browsing.”
We below show how participants’ mental models of “private
browsing” influenced their understanding and usage of private
mode in real life.
Mental models and usage of private mode (as a PET).
After exploring our participants’ conceptual understanding of
the term “private browsing,” we aimed to investigate how
this understanding influenced participants’ mental models and
usage of private mode (as a privacy tool). We identified three
types of users: regular users, occasional users, and former
users. We explain each type as follows:
1. Regular users: Two participants (P01 and P17) were reg-
ular users of private mode. They performed all their browsing
activities in private mode. They described themselves as “para-
noid” and “cautious.” P01 mentioned that the routine use of
private mode made them feel “safer” and “more comfortable.”
Further, P01 used Safari’s private mode to protect against
shoulder-surfing. They explained that Safari does not have a
visual user interface element that indicates a user is currently
browsing privately. However, when probed, P01 (as well as
P17) did not know that staying in private mode for a long
duration of time can easily enable fingerprinting and, hence,
website tracking (a threat that both participants thought they
were protected against by regularly browsing in private mode).
2. Occasional users: Out of 25, 15 participants used private
mode occasionally depending on their browsing activities and
the websites they visited. They did not necessarily use the
mode to visit “embarrassing websites.” Many used private
mode for online shopping (e.g., purchasing a surprise gift for
a family member or a friend), logging into an online service
using a different account, and/or debugging software.
3. Former users: Two participants (P13 and P19) reported
they had used private mode before, but stopped using it for
the following reasons:
• Lack of utility. P13 stopped using private mode because
they thought that web browsers did not allow extensions
to run in private mode (although users can manually
enable extensions in private mode in most browsers).
• Lack of usability. P13 and P19 mentioned that entries
added to the history file would get deleted if they exited
private mode, negatively impacting user experience. P13
also mentioned that private mode is “useless” because
users could delete information about websites visited in
default mode by manually clearing their browsing history
file and cookies (a view shared by P12 and P16).
• Misconceptions about private mode. P13 perceived those
who used private mode as people who “had something
to hide” or “were up to no good,” influencing P13’s
decision to stop using private mode because they did not
want to be perceived by others in their community as “a
cybercriminal” or “a terrorist.” Many participants shared
this perception, as we discuss later in this section.
Several participants (17 out of 25) reported they mainly used
private mode in public spaces, mainly coffee shops, libraries,
and airports. They also performed browsing activities they
regarded as sensitive in private mode. For example,
“I usually use Incognito in . . . you know . . . in Google when
I work at [coffee shop] because I connect to the Internet using
insecure or public Wi-Fi. My laptop consistently warns me. So,
I use Incognito to encrypt my data and hide it from people
around me . . . Better to be safe!” (P05)
“I usually use the public or . . . shared workstations in my
school’s library. You don’t need to login because there is one
account shared by all students. I usually open a private tab
or . . . window – I don’t know – to download files that I want
to be removed after I close the browser . . . By the way, I also
use a private window to send an encrypted email.” (P17)
P17 is a regular user of Safari that locally deletes files
downloaded in its private mode. However, P17 did not notice
he was using Firefox on the library’s computer, which does
not delete private browsing downloads.
“I usually make a bank transfer or access my personal
online accounts – you know, like Facebook – when I use one
of the computers that all passengers can use . . . I am talking
about the computers you find in an airport lounge . . . I open
a private window.” (P07)
“I use Incognito to search for new jobs. As you know, I do
not want my boss or company to know . . . ” (P18)
“If I do not have Tor installed, I will use Incognito.” (P09)
We also found six participants who tended to use private
mode to visit malicious webpages. For example,
“I sometimes encounter a message that warns me from
accessing a bad webpage. I usually ignore the warning and
open the page in a private window . . . Feels safer!” (P14)
Alarmingly, we found that all participants who identified
as either regular or occasional users of private mode
(total=17 participants) performed their private browsing
activities while being authenticated to their personal online
account (e.g., their Google or YouTube account), believing
their search history would be deleted after exiting private
mode).
Additionally, we found that some participants perceived
those who use private mode as people who “care about their
online privacy,” “have something to hide” (e.g., journalists,
activists, dissidents), or “are up to no good” (e.g., cyber-
criminals, terrorists). These inappropriate mental models and
misperceptions partially explain why most users overestimate
the protection private mode offers.
To summarize the findings above, most participants found
utility in private mode (e.g., online shopping, debugging soft-
ware). However, our participants’ conceptual understanding of
the term “private browsing” negatively influenced their usage
of private mode in real life. Many incorrectly believed that
private mode could be used to send encrypted email, achieve
online anonymity, or simply access a phishing webpage be-
cause it “felt safer” to do so.
Security goals of private mode. We aimed to further
investigate how participants perceived the security goals of
private mode. Thus, we asked participants about the entities,
if any, that could learn about their private browsing activities,
what they could learn, and how.
All, but three participants (P03; P18; P25) who identified
as security/privacy experts, did not understand what private
mode could and could not achieve (i.e., did not recognize the
primary security goal of private browsing).
Many participants (19 out of 25) believed that a family
member, a partner/a spouse, a friend, or a work colleague
would not be able to learn about the websites they visited
in private mode “whatsoever” (P01). Ten mentioned that
this would only be possible if the entity was “technically-
sophisticated.” Only P03, P18, and P25 (as mentioned above)
correctly explained that private mode protected against a local
attacker after the user exited private mode.
Several participants (12 out of 25) believed that a browser
vendor (e.g., Google, Microsoft) could not learn their private
browsing activities, citing the following statement that appears
on most browser disclosures: “[Browser vendor] won’t save
your information . . . ” Further, seven participants believed that
private mode would hide their browsing activities from the
employer, six from the ISP, and six from intelligence services
and governments.
As we can see, participants’ perceptions partially explain
why several participants perceived those who used private
mode as paranoid or up to no good.
Expectations. We then asked participants what they expected
from private mode. Again, 19 expected that anyone who had
access to their machine should find no evidence of the websites
visited privately. Additionally, 10 expected that a private
mode that worked properly would not link their browsing
activities in private mode to those in public mode. 13 also
expected that a private mode would protect them from all
types of website tracking and ad targeting. Interestingly, five
participants expected a website visited in private mode would
not be able to determine whether the user is currently browsing
privately or not.
Although some browsers, such as Brave, have added privacy
features to reduce online tracking, no browser meets all par-
ticipants’ expectations. However, we argue that participants’
expectations were high because they overestimated the benefits
of private mode.
D. Part 3: Designing Better Browser Disclosures
We aimed to investigate why existing browser disclosures do
not communicate the actual benefits and limitations of private
browsing. To further test participants’ knowledge of private
mode, we asked them to take a short quiz (see Section IV). Par-
ticipants performed poorly with an average score of 3.21/7.00.
Most participants (21 out of 25) overestimated the benefits of
private mode.
We also asked participants to explain the following items
that appear on most browser disclosures: history file, cookies,
and temporary files. We found that although all participants
correctly described a browsing history file, most participants
(21 out of 25) either had not heard of a cookie or a temporary
file, or did not feel confident explaining what these items
meant (in the context of private browsing). These findings sug-
gest that most participants did not understand the functionality
of private browsing (see Section III), a finding recently echoed
by [14]. However, we argue (in Section VI) that users do
not need to understand private browsing functionality in
order to use private mode correctly.
We then gave our participants a 15-minute tutorial, and
asked them to take the same quiz again. Participants’ quiz
performance significantly improved (mean= 6.31/7.00), which
was an indication that participants could use the knowledge
they newly acquired to critique existing browser disclosures
(related to private browsing) and then design new ones, as we
discuss next.
Hence, we asked participants to critique the disclosures of
Brave, Firefox, and Google Chrome. We describe their views
below:
Private mode. Most participants (20 out of 25) criticized Fire-
fox for describing their private mode as “a private window.”
Further, 17 participants pointed out that although both Brave
and Google Chrome name their private mode “Incognito,” they
still use the phrase “browse privately” in the first sentence of
its browser disclosure, which is “misleading.”
Moreover, 19 participants were confused about when in-
formation (e.g., cookies, search items) about websites visited
in private mode gets deleted: after “closing a private tab?”
(P03), “closing all tabs?” (P09), “closing a [private] window?”
(P11), “closing a session?” (P04; P11; P13; P21), or “shutting
down a browser?” (P09; P14; P17; P20; P21; P22; P24). Also,
five participants questioned whether or not one private session
would be shared across multiple windows or tabs.
We also asked participants to suggest a new name for private
mode, if any. All participants came up with random names:
“non-private,” “everything but private,” “insecure,” “random
mode,” and “useless.” Although all participants agreed that
the term “private browsing” is misleading, there was no clear
winner among the names they suggested.
Primary security goal. The vast majority of participants
(21 out of 25) pointed out that none of the three disclosures
explained the primary security goal of private browsing. Seven
participants pointed out that although the Chrome disclosure
says that “[a user’s] private browsing activity will be hidden
from users sharing the same device,” it does not explain that a
user of the machine could easily monitor other users’ activities
by infecting the machine with a malware.
Many participants (17 out of 25) also mentioned that
browser disclosures should mention all types of attackers that
could violate the security policy of private browsing. They
reported that all browser disclosures mention a subset of all
possible attackers, and not the complete set.
Private browsing functionality. Several participants (16 out
of 25) criticized the use of the following statement by all
three disclosures: “[vendor] will save/won’t save the following
information.” Participants explained that the statement implied
the vendor will not save information on its servers after exiting
private mode. Yet, the true meaning of the statement is that the
vendor will only delete private browsing-related information
from the user’s local device, and not necessarily from the
vendor’s servers.
Further, about two-thirds of participants (17 out of 25)
suggested that the detailed technical explanation of private
browsing functionality (e.g., whether cookies or temporary
files are stored or not after exiting private mode) should be
deferred until the primary security goal is explained in detail,
which is none of the disclosures critiqued does. Participants
mentioned that browser disclosures should explain (in bullet
points) what protection private mode can and should offer
(protecting from a local adversary). Yet, browser disclosures
describe how this protection is achieved (e.g., by deleting
cookies), without explaining what protection private mode
offers.
Tracking protection. Several participants (12 out 25) men-
tioned that a browser disclosure should make it clear that
protecting against website tracking is not a security goal of
private mode. Five participants argued that Brave has been
working on reducing online tracking as a browser feature, and
not as a private mode feature.
Further, four participants argued that most browser vendors
do not have the incentive to implement a private browsing
mode that delivers the level of privacy expected by consumers
(see Section V-D) – mainly because most web browsers (e.g.,
Chrome, Internet Explorer) are owned by companies (e.g.,
Google, Microsoft) that rely on targeting users with adver-
tisements to generate revenue. Hence, participants explained
that disclosures should not use the term “tracking protection”
to advertise the use of private mode.
Chrome performed better. Many participants (18 out of 25)
perceived the Chrome browser disclosure as relatively more
informative when compared to the disclosures of Brave and
Firefox, as it uses a list of bullet points to describe both
private browsing functionality and attackers. In contrast, nine
participants reported that the Brave and Firefox disclosures
gave them the false sense that private browsing aims to protect
against website tracking and ad targeting, increasing their
expectations of the protection offered by private mode beyond
reality. Also, eight participants mentioned they would use
the private mode of Brave and Firefox to perform sensitive
browsing activities (before they were given our tutorial), due
to the use of the following strong statement by Brave: “Private
tabs . . . always vanish when the browser is closed,” and the
use of the shield icon by Firefox. Participants explained that
both the statement and the shield are misleading, and do not
communicate the actual benefits of private mode.
Finally, we asked our participants to purpose new disclosure
designs to better communicate the benefits and limitations of
private mode in different browsers. We discuss the findings in
the next section. We also extract a set of design recommen-
dations to help improve the design of disclosures.
VI. DISCUSSION
The high-level description of private mode as a “private
browsing tab” or a “private browsing window” is not only
vague, but also misleading. Our findings suggest that users’
mental models of the term “private browsing” influence their
understanding and usage of private mode. Incorrect or inap-
propriate mental models – partially derived from this term
– could lead users to overestimate the benefits of private
mode. For example, some of our participants used private
mode to visit webpages not running HTTPS with a valid TLS
certificate, incorrectly believing that private mode encrypted
Internet traffic. We also found that several participants thought
of private mode in connection with end-to-end encrypted
communication tools, Tor, and VPN.
Further, only three participants – who identified as computer
security and privacy experts – correctly explained the primary
security goal of private mode. The vast majority of participants
incorrectly believed that private mode protected against any
local attacker, without considering the scenario of a motivated
local attacker who could infect a shared machine with a
spyware and monitor the user’s private browsing activities.
Therefore, it is critical to communicate the actual protection
private mode offers. Although users might learn about private
mode from peers and online articles, effective disclosures
remain the vendor’s most reliable channel to communicate
information to users. Hence, drawing from the findings of our
study and the browser disclosure designs our participants pro-
posed, we distill the following set of design recommendations
that we encourage browser designers to validate, in order to
design more effective disclosures related to private mode:
Explain the primary security goal. As most participants
pointed out, none of the three browser disclosures they cri-
tiqued explained the main security goal of private mode.
Although the Google Chrome disclosure says: “Other people
who use this device won’t see your activity,” it does not
describe that a malicious user of the device could monitor the
private browsing activities of other users through a spyware
or a key-logger. Hence, disclosures should clearly explain that
private mode only protects against an entity that takes control
of the user’s machine after the user exits private mode.
Explain where information about websites visited in pri-
vate mode is saved. All three browser disclosures have
the following statement: “[Brave; Chrome; Firefox] will not
save the following information: your browsing history, . . . .”
However, several participants argued that this statement is
misleading because it implies the information will not be
stored by the browser vendor on its servers. Browser designers
should consider rewriting the statement to capture the intended
meaning: information will not be locally stored on the user’s
device.
Explain when information will be deleted. Several par-
ticipants pointed out that the browser disclosures of both
Chrome and Firefox do not explain when information (e.g.,
browsing history, cookies) about the websites visited in private
mode gets deleted. Further, some participants mentioned that
although the Brave disclosure says: “[information] always
vanish when the browser is closed,” it does not clearly
communicate the actual functionality of private browsing:
information related to a specific private browsing session gets
deleted after the user terminates that session. Thus, browser
designers should better communicate when private mode-
related information will be removed.
Explain the different types of attackers. Private browsing
does not hide activities performed in private mode from moti-
vated local attackers, web attackers, employers, ISPs, browser
vendors, and governments (see Section III). All three critiqued
browser disclosures mention a subset of these attackers. Fur-
ther, several participants mentioned that disclosures need to
clearly describe the entities it can and cannot protect against
before explaining the detailed functionality of private mode,
as we explain next.
Defer or hide the explanation of functionality. All three
disclosures mention different types of files (e.g., browsing
history file, cookies, temporary files) that get deleted after
the user exits private mode. However, the vast majority of
participants did not feel confident explaining what these files
meant. Further, several participants preferred that disclosures
defer (or hide) the explanation of private browsing functional-
ity until the different types of attackers are described, which
none of the critiqued disclosures does.
Avoid using uncertain or misleading words. The Chrome
disclosure has the following statement: “Your activity might
still be visible to [the websites you visit, your employer,
etc.].” According to many participants, the use of the word
“might” could lead users to incorrectly believe that private
mode protects against, for example, website tracking.
Further, the Brave disclosure states the following: “Private
tabs . . . always vanish when the browser is closed.” However,
it does not explain from where the information gets deleted.
The use of the word “vanish” led several participants to think
that information completely gets removed from local devices
and web servers.
Explain the utility of private mode. Most participants
did not necessarily use private mode to visit “embarrassing
websites.” They used the mode to login into an online service
using another account, debug/test software, or purchase a
surprise gift for a family member or a friend. Hence, some
participants suggested that browser disclosures should promote
the utility of private mode: what the mode can be used for.
Use bullet points and bold fonts. In line with prior work,
most participants used bullet points in their disclosure designs
to explain the functionality and utility of private mode. Our
participants also used bold fonts to emphasize important points
(mainly, the primary security goal of private mode).
Notify users when authenticated. We found all participants
used private mode while being authenticated to online services,
incorrectly thinking their search history would get deleted as
soon as they exited private mode. Several participants noted
they would like to see a mechanism warning them when they
start browsing in private mode while being logged into a
service.
Rethink the name “private browsing”. As our findings
suggest, the name “private browsing” is misleading. Most par-
ticipants were “shocked” and felt “vulnerable” upon learning
the actual benefits and limitations of private mode. They also
suggested different names for private mode, but without a clear
winner. Hence, further work should investigate a new name for
private mode that would capture its proper usage.
Finally, we encourage browser designers to consider the
recommendations we proposed, and design various browser
disclosure prototypes. The prototypes can then be validated
through designing and conducting future user studies. One
possible prototype would be to explain the primary secu-
rity goal of private mode first, followed by a list of bullet
points debunking the myths (or misconceptions) that users
have about private mode.
VII. LIMITATIONS
Our study has a number of limitations common to all
qualitative research studies. First, the quality of qualitative
research mainly depends on the interviewer’s individual skills.
Therefore, to minimize bias, one researcher, who was trained
to conduct interviews and ask questions in an open and neutral
way, conducted all 5 unstructured and 25 semi-structured
interviews, as well as all 5 cognitive interviews (for quiz pre-
testing).
Second, some participants’ answers tended to be less de-
tailed. However, the interviewer prompted participants to give
full answers to all questions. Further, the interviewer gave
participants a 10-minute break between the second (interviews)
and third (participatory design) parts of the study, to reduce
interviewee fatigue and inattention [76] (see Section IV-F).
Third, as with all qualitative studies, our work is limited
by the size and diversity of our sample. Following recom-
mendations from prior work to interview between 12 and 25
participants [80], we interviewed participants until new themes
stopped emerging (total: 25 participants). We also recruited
a demographically-diverse sample of participants in order
to increase the likelihood that relevant findings have been
mentioned by at least one participant.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we investigated why most users misunderstand
the benefits and limitations of private mode. We did so by
designing and conducting a three-part study. We recruited 25
demographically-diverse participants, who used or had used
in the past private mode, for the second and third parts
of the study. We first performed a usability inspection of
private mode using both cognitive walkthrough and heuristic
evaluation. We then conducted a qualitative user study to
explore users’ mental models of private mode and its security
goals. We finally performed a participatory design study to
investigate why existing browser disclosures misinform users
of the actual protection offered by private mode.
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APPENDIX
A. Usability Inspection: Hybrid Approach
We here describe the hybrid approach we used to inspect the
user interface of private mode in web browsers:
1) Provide a detailed description of the user interface.
2) Define the users and their goals.
3) Define the tasks the users would attempt (e.g., accessing
a web page in private mode).
4) Break each task into a sequence of sub-tasks or actions
(e.g., selecting the “New Private Window” option).
5) Walk through each task workflow step-by-step through
the lens of the users (e.g., what they would look for,
what paths they would take, what terms they would
use).
6) For each action, look for and identify usability
problems based on a set of heuristics.
7) Specify where the usability problem is in the user
interface, how severe it is, and possible design fixes.
B. Unstructured Interview Participant Demographics
TABLE III
UNSTRUCTURED INTERVIEW PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHICS
Gender Age Race Education Employment
Male 18–24 Asian Some college Student
Male 35–44 Hispanic B.Sc. Employed
Female 25–34 White M.Sc. Student
Male 18–24 White B.Sc. Student
Female 55–64 Black B.A. Retired
C. Pilot Study: Cognitive Interview Participant
Demographics
TABLE IV
COGNITIVE INTERVIEW PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHICS
Gender Age Race Education Employment
Male 18–24 Black B.Sc. Student
Male 35–44 Asian M.Sc. Employed
Female 18–24 White B.Sc. Student
Male 55–64 White Some college Retired
Female 45–54 Hispanic Some college Employed
D. Selected Participant Mental Models of “Private Browsing”
Fig. 1. Secure/encrypted browser connections. Fig. 2. Secure/encrypted browser connections. Fig. 3. Secure/encrypted browser connections.
Fig. 4. One-factor authentication. Fig. 5. Two-factor authentication. Fig. 6. Anonymous browsing (using Tor).
Fig. 7. Private mode. Fig. 8. Complete online privacy.
Fig. 9. Complete online privacy.
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n
th
re
e
si
m
ul
ta
ne
ou
s
on
e-
da
y
ca
m
pa
ig
ns
ta
rg
et
in
g
ad
ul
t,
gi
ft
sh
op
pi
ng
,a
nd
ne
w
s
w
eb
si
te
s.
•
T
he
y
co
lle
ct
ed
15
5,
22
6
im
pr
es
si
on
s.
•
Pa
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
of
te
n
us
ed
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
to
vi
si
t
ad
ul
t
w
eb
si
te
s,
an
d
no
t
on
lin
e
sh
op
pi
ng
or
ne
w
s
w
eb
si
te
s.
•
Fi
re
fo
x
3.
6
an
d
Sa
fa
ri
4.
0
ha
d
hi
gh
ra
te
s
of
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
us
ag
e,
co
m
pa
re
d
to
G
oo
gl
e
C
hr
om
e
4.
0
an
d
In
te
rn
et
E
xp
lo
re
r
8.
0.
A
gg
ar
w
al
et
al
.
ar
gu
e
w
eb
br
ow
se
rs
th
at
do
no
t
ha
ve
a
vi
su
al
us
er
in
te
rf
ac
e
el
em
en
t
th
at
cl
ea
rl
y
in
di
ca
te
s
a
us
er
is
cu
rr
en
tly
br
ow
si
ng
in
pr
iv
at
e
m
od
e
le
ad
us
er
s
to
op
en
a
pr
iv
at
e
ta
b
or
w
in
do
w
an
d
fo
rg
et
to
cl
os
e
it,
ex
pl
ai
ni
ng
th
e
hi
gh
ra
te
s
of
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
us
ag
e
in
Fi
re
fo
x
3.
6
an
d
Sa
fa
ri
4.
0.
•
N
o
re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
ns
w
er
e
pr
ov
id
ed
.
2
U
nd
er
st
an
di
ng
Pr
iv
at
e
B
ro
w
si
ng
(a
st
ud
y
by
M
oz
ill
a,
20
10
)
[1
0]
•
A
t
w
ha
t
tim
e
of
th
e
da
y
do
pe
op
le
(w
ho
ar
e
aw
ar
e
of
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
)
us
e
pr
iv
at
e
m
od
e?
•
H
ow
lo
ng
do
pe
op
le
st
ay
in
a
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
se
ss
io
n?
•
St
ud
y
ty
pe
:
A
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t
st
ud
y
(q
ua
nt
ita
tiv
e)
.
•
M
oz
ill
a
co
nd
uc
te
d
a
te
st
pi
lo
t
st
ud
y
to
re
co
rd
th
e
tim
e
Fi
re
fo
x
3.
5
us
er
s
ac
tiv
at
ed
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
,a
s
w
el
l
as
th
e
tim
e
th
ey
de
ac
tiv
at
ed
it.
•
Te
st
Pi
lo
t
w
as
de
ve
lo
pe
d
as
an
op
t-
in
se
rv
ic
e
fo
r
Fi
re
fo
x
B
et
a
us
er
s.
•
T
he
st
ud
y
di
d
no
t
in
di
ca
te
th
e
nu
m
be
r
of
B
et
a
us
er
s
w
ho
op
te
d-
in
.
•
Pa
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
lik
el
y
br
ow
se
d
in
pr
iv
at
e
m
od
e
du
ri
ng
lu
nc
ht
im
e
(b
et
w
ee
n
11
:0
0
am
an
d
2:
00
pm
)
an
d
af
te
r
th
ey
ha
d
re
tu
rn
ed
fr
om
sc
ho
ol
or
w
or
k
(a
ro
un
d
5:
00
pm
).
•
Pa
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
us
ua
lly
st
ay
ed
in
a
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
se
ss
io
n
fo
r
ab
ou
t
10
m
in
ut
es
.
•
T
he
du
ra
tio
n
of
a
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
se
ss
io
n
di
d
no
t
co
ns
id
er
ab
ly
flu
ct
ua
te
th
ro
ug
ho
ut
th
e
da
y.
•
N
o
re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
ns
w
er
e
pr
ov
id
ed
.
3
Pr
iv
at
e
B
ro
w
si
ng
:
A
n
In
qu
ir
y
on
U
sa
bi
lit
y
an
d
Pr
iv
ac
y
Pr
ot
ec
tio
n
(W
PE
S,
20
14
)
[1
1]
•
A
re
pe
op
le
aw
ar
e
of
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
?
•
W
ha
t
do
pe
op
le
us
e
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
fo
r?
•
A
t
w
ha
t
tim
e
of
th
e
da
y
do
pe
op
le
br
ow
se
in
pr
iv
at
e
m
od
e?
•
H
ow
do
pe
op
le
pe
rc
ei
ve
th
e
be
ne
fit
s
an
d
dr
aw
ba
ck
s
of
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
?
•
St
ud
y
ty
pe
:
A
su
rv
ey
(q
ua
nt
ita
tiv
e)
.
•
G
ao
et
al
.c
on
du
ct
ed
a
su
rv
ey
of
20
0
U
S
re
sp
on
de
nt
s
(v
ia
M
Tu
rk
).
•
A
bo
ut
on
e-
th
ir
d
of
re
sp
on
de
nt
s
w
er
e
no
t
aw
ar
e
of
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
.
•
R
es
po
nd
en
ts
w
ho
ha
d
us
ed
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
m
en
tio
ne
d
us
in
g
it
fo
r
vi
si
tin
g
ad
ul
t
w
eb
si
te
s,
on
lin
e
sh
op
pi
ng
,a
nd
av
oi
di
ng
w
eb
si
te
tr
ac
ki
ng
.
•
R
es
po
nd
en
ts
re
po
rt
ed
us
in
g
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
du
ri
ng
w
or
k,
or
at
ni
gh
t
(a
ft
er
th
ey
ha
d
re
tu
rn
ed
fr
om
w
or
k)
.
•
So
m
e
re
sp
on
de
nt
s
w
ho
w
er
e
aw
ar
e
of
,a
nd
/o
r
ha
d
us
ed
,p
riv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
in
co
rr
ec
tly
be
lie
ve
d
th
at
pr
iv
at
e
m
od
e
hi
d
th
ei
r
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
ac
tiv
iti
es
fr
om
vi
si
te
d
w
eb
si
te
s.
•
T
he
na
m
e
“p
riv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
”
sh
ou
ld
be
re
th
ou
gh
t.
•
B
ro
w
se
r
di
sc
lo
su
re
s
re
la
te
d
to
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
sh
ou
ld
be
re
de
si
gn
ed
to
be
tte
r
in
fo
rm
us
er
s
of
th
e
be
ne
fit
s
an
d
lim
ita
tio
ns
of
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
.
4
A
St
ud
y
on
Pr
iv
at
e
B
ro
w
si
ng
:
C
on
su
m
er
U
sa
ge
,K
no
w
le
dg
e,
an
d
T
ho
ug
ht
s
(a
st
ud
y
by
D
uc
kD
uc
kG
o,
20
17
)
[1
2]
•
A
re
pe
op
le
aw
ar
e
of
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
?
•
H
ow
do
pe
op
le
us
e
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
?
•
W
ha
t
do
pe
op
le
us
e
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
fo
r?
•
H
ow
do
pe
op
le
pe
rc
ei
ve
th
e
be
ne
fit
s
an
d
dr
aw
ba
ck
s
of
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
?
•
H
ow
do
pe
op
le
re
ac
t
to
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
kn
ow
le
dg
e?
•
St
ud
y
ty
pe
:
A
su
rv
ey
(q
ua
nt
ita
tiv
e)
.
•
D
uc
kD
uc
kG
o
co
nd
uc
te
d
a
su
rv
ey
of
5,
71
0
U
S
re
sp
on
de
nt
s
(v
ia
Su
rv
ey
M
on
ke
y)
.
•
A
bo
ut
on
e-
th
ir
d
of
re
sp
on
de
nt
s
ha
d
no
t
he
ar
d
of
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
.
•
A
bo
ut
on
e-
ha
lf
of
re
sp
on
de
nt
s
ha
d
us
ed
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
at
le
as
t
on
ce
.
•
R
es
po
nd
en
ts
us
ed
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
on
bo
th
de
sk
to
p
an
d
m
ob
ile
ph
on
e.
•
M
os
t
re
sp
on
de
nt
s
us
ed
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
to
vi
si
t
“e
m
ba
rr
as
si
ng
w
eb
si
te
s.”
•
A
bo
ut
th
re
e-
qu
ar
te
rs
of
re
sp
on
de
nt
s
w
er
e
no
t
ab
le
to
co
rr
ec
tly
id
en
tif
y
th
e
be
ne
fit
s
an
d
lim
ita
tio
ns
of
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
.F
ur
th
er
,t
w
o-
th
ir
ds
ov
er
es
tim
at
ed
th
e
be
ne
fit
s
of
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
.
•
So
m
e
re
sp
on
de
nt
s
in
co
rr
ec
tly
th
ou
gh
t
th
at
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
pr
ev
en
te
d
vi
si
te
d
w
eb
si
te
s
fr
om
tr
ac
ki
ng
th
em
,a
s
w
el
l
as
se
ar
ch
en
gi
ne
s
fr
om
kn
ow
in
g
th
ei
r
se
ar
ch
es
.
•
A
bo
ut
tw
o-
th
ir
ds
of
re
sp
on
de
nt
s
fe
lt
“s
ur
pr
is
ed
”
or
“v
ul
ne
ra
bl
e”
up
on
le
ar
ni
ng
ab
ou
t
th
e
ac
tu
al
pr
ot
ec
tio
ns
of
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
.
•
N
o
re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
ns
w
er
e
pr
ov
id
ed
.
5
U
nd
er
st
an
di
ng
W
hy
Pe
op
le
U
se
Pr
iv
at
e
B
ro
w
si
ng
(a
st
ud
y
B
y
E
lie
B
ur
sz
te
in
,2
01
7)
[1
3]
•
A
re
pe
op
le
aw
ar
e
of
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
,a
nd
do
th
ey
us
e
it?
•
W
ha
t
do
pe
op
le
us
e
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
fo
r?
•
W
he
re
do
pe
op
le
us
e
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
?
•
W
ho
do
pe
op
le
hi
de
fr
om
w
he
n
us
in
g
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
?
•
St
ud
y
ty
pe
:
A
su
rv
ey
(q
ua
nt
ita
tiv
e)
.
•
B
ur
sz
te
in
ra
n
a
su
rv
ey
of
20
0
U
S
re
sp
on
de
nt
s
(v
ia
G
oo
gl
e
C
on
su
m
er
Su
rv
ey
s)
.
•
A
bo
ut
on
e-
th
ir
d
of
re
sp
on
de
nt
s
di
d
no
t
kn
ow
w
ha
t
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
is
.
•
O
nl
y
on
e-
fif
th
re
po
rt
ed
us
in
g
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
.
•
O
ne
-h
al
f
of
re
sp
on
de
nt
s
pr
ef
er
re
d
no
t
to
di
sc
lo
se
w
ha
t
th
ey
us
ed
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
fo
r.
O
ne
-fi
ft
h
re
po
rt
ed
us
in
g
it
fo
r
on
lin
e
sh
op
pi
ng
.
•
R
es
po
nd
en
ts
re
po
rt
ed
us
in
g
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
to
hi
de
th
ei
r
br
ow
si
ng
ac
tiv
iti
es
fr
om
pe
op
le
sh
ar
in
g
th
ei
r
co
m
pu
te
r,
th
ei
r
IS
P,
an
d
vi
si
te
d
w
eb
si
te
s.
•
Su
rv
ey
s
ar
e
no
t
th
e
be
st
re
se
ar
ch
m
et
ho
d
to
el
ic
it
us
er
s’
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
ha
bi
ts
du
e
to
th
e
“e
m
ba
rr
as
si
ng
fa
ct
or
.”
•
T
he
co
m
pu
te
r
se
cu
ri
ty
an
d
pr
iv
ac
y
co
m
m
un
ity
sh
ou
ld
ra
is
e
aw
ar
en
es
s
of
th
e
be
ne
fit
s
an
d
lim
ita
tio
ns
of
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
,t
o
en
ab
le
us
er
s
to
m
ak
e
in
fo
rm
ed
de
ci
si
on
s.
6
Yo
ur
Se
cr
et
s
A
re
Sa
fe
:
H
ow
B
ro
w
se
rs
’
E
xp
la
na
tio
ns
Im
pa
ct
M
is
co
nc
ep
tio
ns
A
bo
ut
Pr
iv
at
e
B
ro
w
si
ng
M
od
e
(W
W
W
,2
01
8)
[1
4]
•
Pr
io
r
w
or
k
ha
s
sh
ow
n
th
at
us
er
s
ha
ve
se
ve
ra
l
m
is
co
nc
ep
tio
ns
ab
ou
t
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
,b
ut
do
br
ow
se
r
di
sc
lo
su
re
s
(r
el
at
ed
to
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
)
co
nt
ri
bu
te
to
th
es
e
m
is
co
nc
ep
tio
ns
?
•
St
ud
y
ty
pe
:
A
su
rv
ey
(q
ua
nt
ita
tiv
e)
.
•
W
u
et
al
.c
on
du
ct
ed
a
su
rv
ey
of
46
0
U
S
re
sp
on
de
nt
s
(r
ec
ru
ite
d
vi
a
M
Tu
rk
).
•
R
es
po
nd
en
ts
w
er
e
as
si
gn
ed
on
e
of
13
di
sc
lo
su
re
s
of
di
ff
er
en
t
w
eb
br
ow
se
rs
.
•
B
as
ed
on
th
e
di
sc
lo
su
re
th
ey
sa
w
,r
es
po
nd
en
ts
w
er
e
as
ke
d
to
an
sw
er
a
se
t
of
qu
es
tio
ns
ab
ou
t
w
ha
t
w
ou
ld
ha
pp
en
to
di
ff
er
en
t
ite
m
s
(e
.g
.b
ro
w
si
ng
hi
st
or
y
en
tr
ie
s,
co
ok
ie
s,
do
w
nl
oa
de
d
fil
es
)
w
he
n
br
ow
si
ng
in
pu
bl
ic
an
d
pr
iv
at
e
m
od
es
.
•
T
he
G
oo
gl
e
C
hr
om
e
de
sk
to
p
di
sc
lo
su
re
le
d
re
sp
on
de
nt
s
to
an
sw
er
m
or
e
qu
es
tio
ns
co
rr
ec
tly
.H
ow
ev
er
,a
ll
te
st
ed
br
ow
se
r
di
sc
lo
su
re
s
fa
ile
d
to
co
rr
ec
t
us
er
s’
m
is
co
nc
ep
tio
ns
ab
ou
t
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
.
•
B
ro
w
se
r
di
sc
lo
su
re
s
sh
ou
ld
be
re
de
si
gn
ed
to
be
tte
r
co
m
m
un
ic
at
e
th
e
ac
tu
al
pr
ot
ec
tio
ns
of
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
to
us
er
s.
7
Aw
ay
Fr
om
Pr
yi
ng
E
ye
s:
A
na
ly
zi
ng
U
sa
ge
an
d
U
nd
er
st
an
di
ng
of
Pr
iv
at
e
B
ro
w
si
ng
(S
O
U
PS
,2
01
8)
[1
5]
•
H
ow
do
pe
op
le
us
e
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
?
•
W
ha
t
do
pe
op
le
us
e
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
fo
r?
•
A
re
pe
op
le
at
ri
sk
w
he
n
us
in
g
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
?
•
St
ud
y
ty
pe
:
A
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t
st
ud
y
an
d
a
su
rv
ey
(q
ua
nt
ita
tiv
e)
•
H
ab
ib
et
al
.c
on
du
ct
ed
a
us
er
st
ud
y
of
46
0
U
S
pa
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
w
ho
us
ed
th
e
Se
cu
ri
ty
B
eh
av
io
ur
O
bs
er
va
to
ry
(S
B
O
),
a
pa
ne
l
th
at
ac
tiv
el
y
co
lle
ct
s
da
ta
re
la
te
d
to
se
cu
ri
ty
an
d
pr
iv
ac
y
be
ha
vi
ou
r
of
us
er
s.
•
T
he
y
di
st
ri
bu
te
d
a
fo
llo
w
-u
p
su
rv
ey
(v
ia
SB
O
an
d
M
Tu
rk
),
to
ex
pl
or
e
di
sc
re
pa
nc
ie
s,
if
an
y,
be
tw
ee
n
ob
se
rv
ed
an
d
se
lf
-r
ep
or
te
d
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
be
ha
vi
ou
r.
•
O
nl
y
4%
of
SB
O
pa
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
us
ed
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
.
•
T
he
m
os
t
co
m
m
on
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
ac
tiv
iti
es
(e
.g
.v
is
iti
ng
ad
ul
t
w
eb
si
te
s,
on
lin
e
sh
op
pi
ng
,l
og
gi
ng
in
to
an
on
lin
e
se
rv
ic
e)
w
er
e
th
e
sa
m
e
ac
ro
ss
bo
th
ob
se
rv
ed
an
d
se
lf
-r
ep
or
te
d
da
ta
.
•
M
an
y
pa
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
ov
er
es
tim
at
ed
th
e
be
ne
fit
s
of
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
.
•
B
ro
w
se
r
di
sc
lo
su
re
s
sh
ou
ld
be
re
de
si
gn
ed
.
8
E
va
lu
at
in
g
th
e
E
nd
-U
se
r
E
xp
er
ie
nc
e
of
Pr
iv
at
e
B
ro
w
si
ng
M
od
e
(o
ur
st
ud
y)
•
D
oe
s
pr
iv
at
e
m
od
e
in
di
ff
er
en
t
w
eb
br
ow
se
rs
su
ff
er
fr
om
po
or
us
ab
ili
ty
th
at
ha
m
pe
rs
th
e
w
id
es
pr
ea
d
ad
op
tio
n
an
d
us
e
of
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
?
•
H
ow
do
pe
op
le
pe
rc
ei
ve
th
e
te
rm
“p
riv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
?”
•
W
ha
t
ar
e
pe
op
le
’s
m
en
ta
l
m
od
el
s
of
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
(a
s
a
pr
iv
ac
y-
en
ha
nc
in
g
te
ch
no
lo
gy
)
an
d
its
se
cu
ri
ty
go
al
s?
•
H
ow
do
pe
op
le
pe
rc
ei
ve
th
os
e
w
ho
us
e
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
?
D
o
pe
op
le
pe
rc
ei
ve
th
e
ro
ut
in
e
us
e
of
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
as
“p
ar
an
oi
d”
or
“u
nn
ec
es
sa
ry
?”
•
H
ow
do
pe
op
le
’s
m
en
ta
l
m
od
el
s
an
d
pe
rc
ep
tio
ns
in
flu
en
ce
th
ei
r
us
ag
e
of
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
?
•
W
hy
do
ex
is
tin
g
br
ow
se
r
di
sc
lo
su
re
s
(r
el
at
ed
to
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
)
m
is
in
fo
rm
pe
op
le
of
th
e
be
ne
fit
s
an
d
lim
ita
tio
ns
of
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
?
•
H
ow
ca
n
th
e
de
si
gn
of
br
ow
se
r
di
sc
lo
su
re
s
be
im
pr
ov
ed
?
•
St
ud
y
ty
pe
:
a
us
ab
ili
ty
in
sp
ec
tio
n
+
a
qu
al
ita
tiv
e
st
ud
y.
•
W
e
co
nd
uc
te
d
a
th
re
e-
pa
rt
st
ud
y:
(1
)
a
us
ab
ili
ty
in
sp
ec
tio
n
of
pr
iv
at
e
m
od
e
in
di
ff
er
en
t
w
eb
br
ow
se
rs
;
(2
)
a
qu
al
ita
tiv
e,
in
te
rv
ie
w
-b
as
ed
st
ud
y;
(3
)
a
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
or
y
de
si
gn
st
ud
y.
•
T
he
us
er
in
te
rf
ac
e
of
pr
iv
at
e
m
od
e
vi
ol
at
es
se
ve
ra
l
de
si
gn
pr
in
ci
pl
es
an
d
he
ur
is
tic
s.
•
Pa
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
’
co
nc
ep
tu
al
un
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g
of
th
e
te
rm
“p
riv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
”
in
flu
en
ce
d
th
ei
r
un
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g
an
d
us
ag
e
of
pr
iv
at
e
m
od
e
in
re
al
lif
e.
•
A
lm
os
t
al
l
pa
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
di
d
no
t
un
de
rs
ta
nd
th
e
pr
im
ar
y
se
cu
ri
ty
go
al
of
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
.
•
So
m
e
pa
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
pe
rc
ei
ve
d
th
os
e
w
ho
us
ed
pr
iv
at
e
m
od
e
as
“p
ar
an
oi
d,
”
“h
av
in
g
so
m
et
hi
ng
to
hi
de
,”
or
“u
p
to
no
go
od
.”
•
Pa
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
cr
iti
qu
ed
ex
is
tin
g
br
ow
se
r
di
sc
lo
su
re
s
an
d
de
si
gn
ed
ne
w
on
es
.
•
T
he
ke
y
us
er
-r
el
at
ed
ch
al
le
ng
e
fo
r
pr
iv
at
e
br
ow
si
ng
is
no
t
ad
op
tio
n,
bu
t
ap
pr
op
ri
at
e
us
e.
•
W
e
di
st
ill
ed
a
se
t
of
de
si
gn
re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
ns
to
he
lp
br
ow
se
r
de
si
gn
er
s
de
si
gn
be
tte
r
an
d
m
or
e
ef
fe
ct
iv
e
br
ow
se
r
di
sc
lo
su
re
s.
